Viewed in this way, the trend is all the more notable. The chart shows the rate of famine deaths globally, expressed as the number of people dying each year per , people of the world population. The chart presents this rate averaged across each decade since You can see that the famine mortality rate fell to very low levels over the second half of the 20th century onwards.
As de Wall explains, a continued decline is by no means assured: the future of famine will depend largely on the nature and prevalence of war.
However, as we discuss here , the long-run developments that have contributed to the sharp decline in famine mortality do suggest that the type of catastrophic famine seen in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is very unlikely to return. The geographic spread of famines has also reduced over this period, as we can see in these two charts, which give two ways of visualizing famine deaths by continent.
While in earlier periods Asia suffered heavily from major famines, this came to a halt over the midth century. Since then, famines have almost exclusively been restricted to Africa, with the famine in North Korea being a stark exception. This chart shows the estimated number of people dying in individual famines since the s, based on our dataset of famines.
The length of each line shows the duration of the famine and the color shows the continent in which the famine occurred. As we discuss in our section on Data Quality , historical famine estimates are frequently based on very scant demographic information, and even where such evidence is available there is still disagreement in its interpretation. As such, many of the famines included in our dataset are associated with a wide range of plausible mortality estimates.
In our data, these are represented by upper- and lower-bound estimates, with the mid-point being shown in the visualization above. Two apt examples are the famines in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which took place amidst the Second Congo War beginning in , and that of North Korea from to These famines stand out in recent decades for their particularly high mortality. But in both cases, the range of mortality estimates available in the literature is large, with high and low estimates varying by several millions of deaths.
Where such differences are present, our midpoint estimates are clearly very sensitive to our choice of upper and lower bounds. We have not simply taken the highest and lowest figures published in the public domain, given that more accurate estimates often emerge with time. Inevitably though, this meant us taking a position in some controversial cases, discussed in detail here.
But whilst the number of deaths caused by individual famines is often subject to a good deal of uncertainty, the overall trend over time is very clear: compared to earlier historical periods, far fewer people have died in famines in recent decades.
Whether we consider high or low estimates, or something in between, does not affect this conclusion. In England this was achieved at least a century earlier. This graph shows estimates of the crude population increase — the number of births minus the number of deaths divided by the population — taken from Campbell These figures are based on a national sample of parish register entries, which are available with good coverage from when the registration of baptisms, marriages and burials become enforced.
By comparing the price of grain which was well documented in England from the twelfth century onwards with estimates for real wages and grain yields, the author was able to make reasoned speculations about which of the documented sudden drops in population were likely to have resulted from famine, as opposed to disease epidemics unrelated to food shortages.
The idea is that even if harvests were bad, if there was no simultaneous rise in grain prices it seems more likely that disease would have been the main driver of population losses, as opposed to famine the lower population reducing the demand for food, thereby offsetting the reduced supply to keep prices roughly level. Saito has created a chronology of famines in Japan since the 6th century.
Before the 14th century data is judged to be incomplete although the records for the 8th and 9th are surprisingly complete — there were more than 35 famines in each of the two centuries. None of these famines happened in the twentieth century and the graph here shows that the end of starvation in Japan arrived gradually. Before there were more than 10 famines per 50 year-interval and since then famines have became less and less common in Japan.
It is very difficult to know how common famines were in the distant past given the absence of historical record. We might therefore reasonably expect an upward bias in the figures for earlier famines on the record. We might naturally tend to associate famine with drought or other natural phenomena, and indeed most documented famines have occurred in the context of harvest failures, often due to droughts or flooding.
However, in recent times, aggregate food availability per person has increased dramatically, and given the comparable ease of transportation and communication, localized shortfalls can — in theory at least — be met by importing food from surplus areas far quicker and at a much lower cost nowadays. As such, lack of overall food availability per se plays a less prominent role in causing famine today than it did historically.
Better integrated food markets have on the whole helped to ease acute localized food price volatility due to bad harvests. Food shortages that lead to higher prices create an incentive for traders to increase the supply of food, thereby preventing shortages developing into outright food crises. Thus the absence of markets, or presence of badly functioning markets, can be a key part of why people are not able to obtain enough food. Where means of transport is lacking, trade between surplus and deficit regions can be hampered, as well as making the distribution of food aid much harder during crises.
Comparable climatic conditions that sparked two famines in northern China, in the s and s respectively, brought about million deaths in the first case and half a million in the latter. One important difference that can explain this moderated impact is the availability of greatly improved transport infrastructure that was constructed in the interim which allowed for prompt relief efforts to take place.
The more limited development of transport infrastructure in parts of Africa has played a contributory role in a number of recent famines on the continent. Where traders have some monopoly power over local markets, hoarding can be a way of increasing profits by making prices rise. Even without monopoly power, where traders collectively expect prices to increase, for whatever reason, it can make sense for them not to sell storable food to final consumers immediately, but rather wait for the higher prices, thereby restricting the current overall supply to consumers.
Again, this is part of the normal functioning of a market which encourages food to be transferred from periods of relative plenty to those of relative scarcity. Such self-fulfilling expectations of price increases can occur simply where people have mutually reinforcing, but nonetheless mistaken beliefs about future supply. According to Ravaillion , such a dynamic was indeed at play during the Bangladesh famine, in which food prices soared despite there being no significant drop in food production or in overall food availability per person.
For instance, where a weather event such as the severe flooding that occurred during the Bangladesh famine of makes people think there will be shortages, resulting panic buying and price speculation can itself then produce scarcity artificially. It also shows a sharp increase in the differences in food prices between different regions in Bangladesh as measured by the standard deviation. This is evidence that, during the famine, markets became more spatially segregated — i.
The absence of properly functioning markets thus contributed to the localized scarcities. International aid continues to play a large role in addressing food security, both in emergency situations and to help relieve more persistent periods of food insufficiency the World Food Program collects data on the quantity and value of international food aid and is available here. The development of better monitoring systems, such as the Famine Early Warning System , has given the international relief community more advanced notice of developing food crises, although such early warnings by no means guarantee a sufficient aid response, nor that secure access to affected areas will be granted.
Thus, whilst drought or flood-caused crop failure might naturally seem to be high up on a list of causes of famine, this was far truer of famines in the past. Nowadays, crop failure is better understood as an important contributing factor rather than a sufficient cause of famine: food crises due simply to localized drops in production do not tend to develop into full-blown famines with high excess mortality unless exacerbated through more overtly human influences.
As Amartya Sen argued, the fact that there may be enough food available in aggregate within a given area does not necessarily mean that everyone will be able to afford it. Food crises are often precipitated by spikes in the price of food relative to wages, or the collapse in the price of assets owned. The latter commonly accompanies famines due to many people all at once trying to sell their assets for instance their livestock in order to be able to buy more food.
Wealthy countries have very few people living in such extreme absolute poverty , both because of higher incomes before tax and benefits, but also due higher government expenditures and transfers. It is therefore unsurprising that those countries in which famines occur do tend to be very poor.
Here we show the inflation-adjusted income per capita of each country at the time they experienced a famine, with some reference points on the vertical axis. As you can see, most countries in which a famine took place had, at the time, average incomes less than half of that of the UK at the outset of its industrial revolution.
You can see that average incomes in India — a country that historically suffered very heavily from famine — has grown rapidly in recent decades, and at the same time has been famine free. African countries, conversely, have on the whole has remained very poor and make up the majority of recent famines. As well as proxying for the presence of extreme poverty, this relationship also reflects the fact that poorer countries also tend have less adequate facilities like transport infrastructure, sanitation and systems of healthcare that play a key role in preventing or moderating the impacts of food shortages.
Whilst poverty certainly increases the vulnerability of a country, we should be careful not to think of it as the single, or even the most important, cause of famine, given the typically political nature of most outbreaks of famine.
He suggested that democratic authorities are incentivized by elections to be more responsive to food crises and that the presence of a free press can quickly draw attention to the event and hold government to account.
According to the definitions we have adopted, three famines since took place in democracies. The St. Lawrence Island famine of is listed as occurring in the USA. However, it took place on a very remote Alaskan island populated by the indigenous Yupik people, that had relatively little interaction with mainland USA.
In the case of Sudan, according to its Polity IV score, there was a brief spell of democracy, following elections held in But it is somewhat misleading to consider the famine occurring in southern Sudan in as happening under conditions of a functioning democracy. According to Wikipedia , in the majority of seats in the southern regions voting was in fact suspended for the election.
In the third case, that of Maharashtra in India in , whilst there is no ambiguity as to the political regime type, there has been some disagreement as to whether excess mortality in fact occurred. This is discussed further in the Data Quality and Definition section below.
In any case, whilst in absolute terms it is certain that the drought caused enormous suffering, whatever excess mortality that did occur in Maharashtra was very much lower than the major famines occurring under totalitarian regimes in roughly the same period. It is important to note, however, that the question of how often famines have occurred within democracies crucially depends upon the definition of famine being used.
In particular, what, if any, excess mortality lower-bound is being used yields different answers. This leaves only the three democracy famine events discussed above. Regardless of the threshold though, the main point remains the same: famines tend not to occur in democracies, and none of the catastrophic life-taking famines documented in history have occurred in the context of functioning democratic institutions. Many of the major famine events in our table occurred as the consequence of international or civil war.
For some of these, famine was used as an intentional part of political or military strategy. Despite the plan only being partially executed, over 4. In terms of more recent events, from the second half of the 20th century onwards, famines in Africa have become increasingly associated with civil war, and include a number of crises in places that were not previously prone to famines at all, such as Mozambique and Biafra in Nigeria.
In addition to the direct casualties, conflict can also generate disruption to production and trade and can encourage the spread of disease epidemics, particularly through forced migration. It is mainly in the context of conflict that major death-dealing famines can be expected today.
It is important to note that, as opposed to dying from literal starvation, the vast majority of people that die during famines actually succumb to infectious disease or other illnesses, with some diseases being more directly linked to diet than others.
Famines brought on by drought often go hand-in-hand with a scarcity of clean drinking water that increases the threat of cholera and other diseases.
Increased migration and the disruption of personal hygiene and sanitation routines and healthcare systems also increases the risk of outbreaks of infections diseases, all in the context of a population already weakened through malnourishment.
This is particularly true in places where such diseases are already endemic. Thus, in sub-Saharan Africa where vaccination rates for measles have been relatively low , the disease has been a big killer during modern famines in the region alongside other infectious and parasitic diseases common in non-crisis times.
In each case, it can be seen that communicable diseases were the ultimate cause of death in the majority of cases. Note that, for India and Moscow, the excess mortality attributable to starvation is not available separately.
This is in contrast to some famines that occurred in industrialised countries during WWII, in a context of overall healthier populations and systems of sanitation that were maintained to some degree despite the crisis.
In these instances disease played far less of a role, with deaths from starvation correspondingly higher. In February , parts of South Sudan were officially declared by the UN as being in famine — the first such declaration since By May the famine had apparently receded, thanks to an effective aid response that averted large-scale loss of life.
But famines are usually caused by multiple factors, compounded by poor or even intentionally bad policy decisions that make people vulnerable. When no one addresses this vulnerability, it leads to famine.
Unfortunately there are still some cases of conflict that have plunged millions into poverty and hunger, making people even more vulnerable to the coronavirus. Conflict and a lengthy, serious drought in Somalia and other parts of the Horn of Africa has killed off most of the crops and livestock, the main assets for many families. The situation in the Horn is compounded by climate change and now an upsurge in desert locusts across East Africa. The conflict in Yemen is has been going on for six years now.
Aid groups such as Oxfam and UN agencies including the Famine Early Warning System have been warning the world about this deteriorating situation for some time. Oxfam is actively working to reduce the likelihood of famine and end world hunger. Here are some ways we are getting involved:. Clean water for drinking, cooking, and washing hands is essential in any humanitarian emergency to avoid deadly water-borne diseases such as cholera or coronavirus.
But any stomach ailment from dirty water will rob people of the nutrition they can derive from whatever food they can find.
Children under 5 are particularly vulnerable. Oxfam helps improve and repair wells , and trucks in water to areas where there is none. Oxfam helps construct latrines and distributes hygiene items like soap so people can wash their hands. When food is available in markets, but might be scarce or very expensive for some, Oxfam distributes cash. Oxfam also distributes emergency food when necessary.
First Known Use of famine 14th century, in the meaning defined at sense 1. Learn More About famine. Time Traveler for famine The first known use of famine was in the 14th century See more words from the same century. Style: MLA. English Language Learners Definition of famine. Kids Definition of famine. Get Word of the Day daily email!
Test Your Vocabulary. Test your vocabulary with our question quiz! Daniel Malloy September 3, Ozy. Pallabi Munsi August 16, Ozy.
A Justification For Unrest? Showell's Dictionary of Birmingham Thomas T. Harman and Walter Showell. King Robert the Bruce A.
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